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| The Handling of Torturegate: "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" |
| 05.27.04 (7:54 am) [edit] |
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In July of 2003, red-faced White House surrogates were issuing mea culpas over the false claims in President Bush’s State of the Union Address that Iraq had sought yellow-cake uranium from Niger. But whether it was the president, Conde Rice, George Tenet, or Ari Fleischer doing the talking, the apologies, corrections, and equivocations rang hollowly from the start, for one simple reason. Any president who had unknowingly been fed embarrassing, phony information in his most important speech of the year—information that caused many to believe that he was either foolish, manipulative, or just plain mendacious—would be furious at the officials who gave him the misinformation. One would expect that heads would roll at such a serious error, particularly at such a sensitive point in time. However, no such reaction occurred. It was left to CIA Director George Tenet, on July 11, to fall on his sword over the fiasco: “The President had every reason to believe that the text presented to him was sound. These 16 words should never have been included in the text written for the President.” So Tenet had seriously failed his boss, right? Well, not exactly. The very next day, in Abuja, Nigeria, the president had these interesting words about Tenet: “I’ve got confidence in George Tenet. I’ve got confidence in the men and women who work at the CIA and I...look forward to working with them.” These words certainly don’t sound like those of a president who had been seriously let down by the CIA; rather, they are far more suggestive of a president who was a knowing accomplice in an effort to mislead the American people. When the Niger claim was exposed as a fraud, the reaction from the White House was not one of indignation, but something more on the order of, “oops, never mind.” Indeed, when pressed on July 12 as to whether he thought the controversy was over with, Bush replied, “I do.” I raise the Niger incident because its dynamics so clearly resemble the White House response to Torturegate: A minimum of responsibility-taking, combined with a concerted effort to whitewash the story and make it go away. Since it is now abundantly clear that the handling of the Abu Ghraib abuses involved a massive failure throughout the military chain of command, one has to ask where, once again, is the President’s outrage? Other than a token slap on the wrist administered to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld—a slap that lasted one day--there is no apparent anger that the enormity of the scandal was not immediately communicated to the top of the chain of command. There is no censuring of subordinates for their unconcern about the scandal, for their lack of appreciation of the toxic effect that it would have on diplomacy, or for how it would imperil our troops in the field. Given all that has come to light, it is difficult to explain the White House’s reluctance to discipline any of the Pentagon officials who averted their eyes from the scandal even after it was right in front of them. The simplest explanation is the most compelling here: From the President on down to General Sanchez of Central Command in Baghdad, the military hierarchy thought they could hide the scandal and not get caught. Indeed, if one observes the behavior of senior Pentagon officials, every action seems to have been designed to conceal, to minimize, to keep the reality of the scandal bottled up at as low a command level as possible. Let’s look at the most recent evidence: 1) Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, as Commander of the 800th Military Brigade, supervised the 16 prisons in Iraq. In January, 2003, she received an “admonishment” from Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez for her lax oversight of Abu Ghriab Prison. While one of the first to be targeted for her lack of leadership, Karpinski, for her part, has some interesting things to say about Sanchez’s behavior during the initial phase of the scandal. As reported in USA Today, according to Karpinski, when Sanchez first saw the photos on January 13, 2003, he made no attempt to communicate with her, sought no information from her, and gave her no notification of the abuse. Indeed, Karpinski learned of the misconduct six days later, somewhat offhandedly in an email from a military investigator who was gathering information about the scandal. Says Karpinski, “If General Sanchez was always thinking that I was at fault here, and my leadership abilities failed, why didn’t he summon me the moment he saw the photographs? Doesn’t that make you scratch your head? I don’t want to make it appear that I’m accusing Sanchez of anything, but he never called me.” Karpinski then offered an even more startling look into how Sanchez handled the crisis. In late January, after rumors of the abuse had begun to spread, Karpinski, who speaks Arabic, suggested to Sanchez that she go on Iraqi television to reassure the Iraqi people that the abuses had not been authorized by the military. According to Karpinski, Sanchez’s response was a terse, “Absolutely not. We’re handling this.” Says Karpinski, “When I left the headquarters after that meeting…I left feeling like ‘Holy mackerel. What is going on here?’ That’s one of the most troubling aspects of this for me…how much he knew and when he knew it.” Finally, how odd is it that Karpinski did not see the damning photos until April 28, when they were first aired by “60 MinutesII”? It is easy to understand Karpinski’s perplexity at these events. As the senior commander in Baghdad, Sanchez’s responsibility was to both understand the magnitude of the scandal, and to communicate it fully to his superiors. If he understood the horrific nature of the misconduct and communicated it properly up the chain of command, then his superiors were fully informed, were guilty of dereliction, and we should hold them accountable; if, on the other hand, he did not communicate the gravity of the abuse, then his immediate superiors should be outraged at Sanchez for sugarcoating the nature of the misconduct. It’s either one or the other. The White House and the Pentagon can’t have it both ways. If Sanchez communicated appropriately to Myers and Rumsfeld, then Bush should be furious at their leadership failure; if Sanchez didn’t, then he was seriously derelict. What’s missing in all this is a proportionate response from the White House. Once again, where’s the outrage? It is hard not to conclude that Bush’s unwillingness to penalize anyone in the Pentagon stems from the fact that the White House and the Pentagon were in cahoots. They had the same strategic goal with respect to Torturegate, that of keeping a lid on things, covering up the scandal. Dan Rather spoiled the party. 2. On May 20, ABC News reported that Sgt. Samuel Provance, who ran the top secret computer system at Abu Ghraib, had decided to speak out about what he knew. Provance, during his 6 months at Abu Ghriab, had heard many accounts from the members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade about how they were directing the guards to strip the prisoners of clothing, force them to wear women’s underwear, knock them unconscious, deprive them of food, and strip female prisoners to the waist. These intelligence personnel dismissed any concerns about inhumane treatment by saying that the prisoners, after all, were the “enemy.” Worse, when he reported this information to Maj. Gen. Fay who now purports to be doing a thorough investigation, Provance says that Fay discouraged him from testifying, telling him to keep his mouth shut about these things if he valued his career. Concluded Provance, "I would say many people are probably hiding and wishing to God that this storm passes without them having to be investigated [or] personally looked at." It turns out that Provance’s fears about his own career jeopardy were well founded: One day after he went public, the military took away his security clearance and “flagged” him, meaning that he is currently ineligible for promotion or honors. Provance says about this turn of events, "I feel like I'm being punished for telling the truth. I don't regret it. I want people to understand what happened." It is apparent that Provance received the same crystal clear message that Karpinski did: Don’t ask, don’t tell, “we’re handling this.” 3. The Pentagon has come up with a flurry of rationales for keeping the remainder of the photos from Abu Ghriab hidden from public view. But certainly the most bizarre explanation was the one recently advanced by Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Myers. Myers took the position that to show more photos from Abu Ghriab would violate the Geneva Conventions, since those rules prohibit actions that would subject prisoners to humiliation and ridicule. Huh? The notion that the actual exposing and documenting of the abuse at Abu Ghriab would violate the Geneva Conventions, can only be called surrealistic, particularly when it is now clear that prisoners from Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, and Irag all were treated with complete disregard for Geneva standards of humanity. The idea that after months of coercive, torturous methods of interrogation in numerous theaters, Myers has suddenly found religion, and is worried about violating the Geneva Conventions, can only be taken as a sick joke. Showing the photos in no way ridicules the Iraqis; rather it serves to restore their dignity. Of course, Myers is not really worried about ridiculing the prisoners—all identities of prisoners could easily be electronically disguised—rather, he’s worried about subjecting his own chain of command to ridicule. Never has such a bald-faced attempt to cover one’s derriere been offered so sanctimoniously. 4. Not only has Torturegate led to a world-wide devaluation of the moral standing of the United States, it has caused this writer to feel cynical about the Geneva Conventions themselves. However lofty and noble these principles of humane treatment may be, one can’t help but be dismayed by their toothlessness, by the utter absence of any enforcement mechanism to make sure that they are followed. When Rumsfeld attempted to reassure the nation recently, by saying that Pentagon lawyers had cleared the Army’s interrogation techniques, it only added to the theater of the absurd: If countries are left free to interpret the Geneva principles as they see fit, then the principles lose all meaning. The foxes cannot be the guards of the chicken coop. Finally, let me make several predictions. First, I predict that in spite of the Bush administration’s best efforts, we will eventually know the full story of Torturegate. As each culprit on the chain of command rats on his superiors, the cover-up will come crashing down like a lengthy array of dominoes. Second, I predict that when we learn the full scope of the scandal, it will be worse than Watergate. After all, in Watergate, no one was beaten, no one was raped, no one was murdered. And just as Watergate led to a range of measures to restore the integrity of our democratic institutions, Torturegate will leave its own legacy: The Pentagon’s approach to the scandal--“don’t ask, don’t tell”--will some day resonate just as ignominiously as the phrase “I was just following orders” did at Nuremberg. |
| 2 Comments |
| Musings From the Vegas Strip: Abu Ghraib, Kerry, and Nader |
| 05.20.04 (7:19 am) [edit] |
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Vacationing this week in Las Vegas, “sin city,” hasn’t caused me to take my eye off the ball. What better vantage point from which to study the ongoing sins of the Bush administration? “Military Music: Can You Dance to It?” The court-martial today of Spc. Jeremy Sivits, held at the Baghdad Convention Center, and attended by both Arab and U.S. media, will begin to give the country will an important civics lesson. We’ll not only learn more about the sinister goings-on at Abu Ghraib prison, we’ll also get a crash court in the basics of military trials, which, as an article in Seattle Times pointed out, depart significantly from civilian notions of justice. Over the next months, we will experience first-hand the meaning of French statesman Georges Clemenceau’s sardonic comment that “Military justice is to justice, what military music is to music.” It is important to take note of the differences between civilian and military trials: First, a military defendant is not entitled to a jury by his peers. Instead, a jury of five or more serviceman sits in judgment, and can be handpicked by the commanders. Kevin Barry, a Chantilly, Va., lawyer and a former Coast Guard appellate judge, comments on this process: “Can you get a fair trial? Yes. But you never can know for sure, and the reason is this selection process. The aura of command influence in the role of the convening authority is always there.” This raises a deep irony. For all the apparent hand wringing by Secretary Rumsfeld about not wanting to exert inappropriate command influence over the legal process, disproportionate command influence over jury selection is actually embedded within the military system: The convening commander can hand pick the individuals he wants to sit on the jury. While Britain and Canada have discarded this procedure as a recipe for bias, it still exists within the American military. Second, in a court-martial, no unanimous verdict is required. Rather, a defendant can be convicted by a two-thirds vote of the jury, who themselves are entitled to take notes and ask questions. Nor are there any mandatory sentencing constraints; a jury may find a defendant guilty, but decide that no punishment is warranted. As the Arab media express serious doubts about the legitimacy of these courts-martial in ferreting out the truth, a report today by ABC News can only add to their cynicism: “No Singing Canaries Please.” ABC News is reporting that the former Intel Staffer at Abu Ghraib prison, Sgt. Samuel Provance, has alleged that even as the courts-martial of the military police are getting under way, there is still a pervasive cover-up around the events at the prison. Sgt. Provance, now stationed in Germany, states firmly and clearly, “There's definitely a cover-up. People are either telling themselves or being told to be quiet.” Sgt. Provance’s comments may serve to checkmate those in the military hierarchy who hope to limit the scandal to a handful of guards. Provance’s statement is particularly damning to the military brass, because he was responsible for the top secret computer system used by military intelligence at Abu Ghraib, and in so doing, served as a hub of information for military intelligence operatives. Provance reports that while he did not directly observe the abuse, the intelligence officials with whom he interacted spoke openly and easily about their role in the abuse, acknowledging that they directed the MPs to mistreat and abuse the prisoners. Here Provance gives his take on the culture of torture at Abu Ghraib: “One interrogator told me about how commonly the detainees were stripped naked, and in some occasions, wearing women's underwear. If it's your job to strip people naked, yell at them, scream at them, humiliate them, it's not going to be too hard to move from that to another level.” Provance describes being told about MPs knocking out prisoners by striking them around the neck area, and male MPs stripping female detainees to the waist. Far more damning than his confirmation of the widely suspected complicity of military intelligence officials in Torturegate, is his allegation that seniors officers have tried to muzzle him, telling him to keep his information to himself. Maj. Gen. George Fay, whose investigation into the abuse at Abu Ghraib has been trumpeted by the Pentagon as a sort of gold standard, a definitive study of what happened at Abu Ghraib, gets less than stellar marks from Sgt. Provance. He claims that Fay, while interviewing him, focused overwhelmingly on the guards, and wanted to hear very little about the involvement of military intelligence. Moreover, Provance says that Gen. Fay discouraged him from testifying, and gave him the clear sense that his career would suffer if he spoke out: "I feel like I'm being punished for being honest. You know, it was almost as if I actually felt if all my statements were shredded and I said, like most everybody else, 'I didn't hear anything, I didn't see anything, I don't know what you're talking about,' then my life would be just fine right now." Interestingly, Army officals do not entirely dispute Provance’s allegations, commenting that it is “routine procedure to advise military personnel under investigative review" not to comment. That is far less of a denial, than it is the best available spin on Sgt. Provance’s allegations. These charges by Provance truly throw into question the zeal, scope, integrity, and good faith of the Fay investigation. As I have said at every chapter of this disgraceful scandal, I smell cover-up. "Kerry, Kerry, Quite Contrary." When Ralph Nader was on CNN’s Late Edition last Sunday, he told Wolf Blitzer that for all John Kerry’s talk about the two of them getting together for a meeting of the minds, all of Nader’s phone calls to the Kerry campaign to set up such a meeting had gone unreturned. Perhaps Nader’s publicizing of this cold shoulder treatment lit a fire under Kerry, because all of a sudden the two men are scheduled to meet today. I confess that I have profoundly mixed feelings about Nader. On the positive side, I admire him greatly, not only for having served as the greatest consumer watchdog in the nation’s history, but also at 70, for still having the intense fire in the belly that serves as a model for all of us. I only wish that we could give Kerry a tranfusion of some of Nader’s focus, intensity, and clarity of commitment on the issues. However, I do have a bone to pick with Nader, on a matter that I have not heard anyone address: If Nader’s third-party campaign exists to highlight important issues that have gotten left out of the two-party dialogue, why on earth did Nader not run for the Democratic nomination during the Democratic primary season? He could have participated in every Democratic debate, and found a tremendous platform from which to air his putatively unique point of view. His audience would have been far greater than any audience he now gets, his message would have resonated more, and he would have had the prospect of significantly transforming the Democratic agenda, just as Howard Dean did. Why would he pass on that great opportunity, instead choosing to emerge only afterward to say that the two-party system is a failure? To me, this is the mystifying aspect to Nader’s current campaign: He passed on a chance to gain a national audience during the Democratic primary season, and then afterward chose to run what amounts to a nuisance candidacy. I’d like to hear him address this confusing strategy. Well, signing off for today: Hey, do you think it’s easy transitioning from Torturegate to Cirque du Soleil?? |
| 0 Comments |
| LaToya London: Too Classy for American Idol |
| 05.14.04 (6:42 am) [edit] |
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If Latoya London were a comedian, they would have said that she was “too hip for the room.” If LaToya were a politician, they would have called her “too decent” for the world of politics. But she inhabited the world of reality television, and in the end, was simply too balanced, too talented, too confident, and too classy to survive in that dysfunctional environment. While reality shows differ widely in their quality, their entertainment value, and their tawdriness, they all have one thing in common. Each thrives on putting people in stressful situations designed to cause the contestants to regress, to break down in some way. That gives those of us in the audience the voyeuristic pleasure of seeing the contestants in duress, warts and all. We then get the satisfaction of saying to ourselves, “Ah ha! Regardless of how smart/talented/strong those folks are, they can’t stand up to that situation—now they're showing their true colors!” Vulnerability and insecurity are the currency of reality shows, because such characteristics not only make for more drama, they allow us to revel in the fact that “that person is no better than I am with all my insecurities!” Here’s a taste of real American Idol fandom, taken from the Entertainment Weekly (ew.com) message board: “Our Girl Scout Troop watched A.I. together and when Randy and Simon made Jasmine cry, we each decided to go home and set our computers to dial in votes for Jasmine. There are 23 of us and we each averaged about 6 calls per minute (23 x 6 x 120) which is about 16,000 votes. Although, I do agree that Latoya is a better singer than Jasmine, it is not right to humiliate someone until she cries. I'm sure alot of people wanted to help Jasmine because of the unfair treatment - BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN WE ARE RACISTS! Shame on Randy and Simon for their actions.” There was a foreshadowing of LaToya’s demise on “Disco Night,” when host Ryan Seacrest addressed the issue of LaToya’s unflappable poise: Wasn’t she feeling more pressure as the show entered the home stretch? Rather than tell some compelling story about having been wracked with nerves all day, LaToya told the truth, that in fact, the pressure was off: “At this point in the competition I feel like we’re all winners.” She went on to add that each would likely get a recording contract. I could almost hear the producers of the show gnashing their teeth, as soon as the words came out of her mouth. Damn! She had just let the air out of the balloon, and had told the dirty little secret: The real pressure is in trying to make the final twelve. Once you’ve made it to the final four, you’ve already had a billion dollars worth of exposure and have laid the foundation for your singing career. This was anathema even to Simon, who noted that she should feel more urgency about winning the title. Note to Simon: She never said she didn’t want to win—only that she wasn’t going to get stressed over the issue. Many in the audience, however, agreed with Simon, and took it personally. Here are some fresh comments from the Entertainment Weekly message board: “Florida”: I’d rather have Diana’s fake smile than LaToya’s robot like attitude and smile. She practically told use not to vote for her because she was getting a record deal with or without us. Guess she’ll get it without us. “Josh”: Simon told LaToya time and time again that she needed to show more personality, and she callously blew off his comments. She didn't grow at all and deserved to go. I always thought she possessed a certain arrogance (call it unappealing confidence if you prefer) that wasn't very endearing. In other words, how dare she show such confidence and not reinvent herself according to Simon’s wishes!? Simon underscored his disappointment when he said to LaToya, “I don’t feel that I know any more about you now, than I did 10 weeks ago.” Unlike Simon, I do feel that I know more about her than 10 weeks ago. And what I know, I like. I could not have guessed the range and breadth of her talent, her versatility, 10 weeks ago. She took every genre that they threw at her and hit a home run week after week. Heck, they could have had “opera week,” and she still would have excelled. Interestingly, she also got prettier each week—no easy feat! Ironically, LaToya’s eviction led to one of the more fascinating television moments of recent times: There was LaToya, confidently singing her final song (Streisand’s Don’t Rain on My Parade), as everyone around her—contestants and judges alike—were in tears. They were crying in part because of the great bond that develops over time between show members. But they were also crying for another reason: Everyone recognized on some level that the travesty they had just witnessed would have the effect of diminishing both the show, and this year’s title. Her loss is a stain on American Idol that will not be easily washed away. LaToya was simply the best pure singer that AI has ever seen. Unlike other contestants, where you often had to forgive a note here and there as they flounced through the audience, Latoya never sacrificed a note in her songs; every note counted, and every note worked. Nor, unlike Clay, are her musical sensibilities so hopelessly kitschy that she will be reduced to doing Christmas albums. For all the talk about her being emotionally flat, I saw just the opposite: There is tremendous sophistication and nuance in her voice; the sky’s the limit, the world is her oyster. Good luck to you, Latoya; I’ll catch you on my FM dial. |
| 1 Comments |
| "Torturegate" for Dummies |
| 05.12.04 (4:14 pm) [edit] |
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Do you constantly trip over the name “Taguba?” Do acronyms like CentCom and ICRC make your eyes glaze over? Do you think that the Geneva Conventions were a series of trade shows held in Las Vegas? Do you wonder what the devil the difference is between a “brigadier general” and a “lieutenant general?” If so, then this blog entry is for you. Let’s start with the chronology of how we got into this mess, known as Torturegate: 2002 Feb 8, 2002: Defense secretary Rumsfeld announces that men presumed to be Al Qaeda members, captured in Afghanistan, are not covered by the Geneva Conventions. [The Geneva Conventions are a group of agreements, first developed in Geneva, Switzerland in 1864, that establish international rules for dealing humanely with prisoners of war, the sick, the wounded, and the dead. The most recent Geneva Convention was in 1949, which dealt with issues raised by WW2.] December, 2002: In separate situations, two Afghan detainees held by the U.S. die as a result of blunt-force injuries. The deaths were determined to be homicides, and remain under investigation today. 2003 March 19, 2003: The U.S. begins the Iraq war. May, 2003: Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross report abuses in U.S. run prisons in Iraq. June 30, 2003: Reserve Brigadier Janis Karpinski is appointed the commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade, which has the responsibility of guarding military prisons. A “brigadier general” is fourth in the military hierarchy, below a general, a lieutenant general, and a major general. It is one rank above a colonel. July 30, 2003: Amnesty International issues its first report of torture being carried out by coalition forces in Iraq. These reports were made to CentCom, or the Central Command, in Baghdad. [The U.S. Central Command, headed by General John Abizaid, is actually located in Tampa, Florida. Sometimes the term CentCom refers to the headquarters in Florida, but usually, in the context of the Iraq war, it refers to Baghdad where Lt. General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander of Allied Forces, is stationed.] August, 2003: Both chief Iraq administrator L. Paul Bremer and Secretary of State Colin Powell raise the issue of excessively long detentions of Iraqi prisoners with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. Sept 9, 2003: Maj. General Geoffrey Miller, then commander of the Guantanamo Bay prison, recommends that intelligence officials take operational control of Abu Ghriab prison, and that the military police (MPs) will “set the conditions for successful interrogation and exploitation of” the prisoners. Whether this was a signal to MPs to be abusive with prisoners is currently a matter of great dispute. Oct.-Dec, 2003: In the wake of General Miller’s recommendation, significant abuses occur at Ab Ghriab. Based on first person testimony and photos, these include sexual and physical abuse, rape, sodomy, and murder. October, 2003: The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducts a surprise inspection of of Abu Ghraib prison, and finds major abuses. It submits a report to officials in Iraq, specifying the abuses. Rumsfeld says he had no knowledge of the report. November 6, 2003. Maj. General Donald Ryder completes his report into the conditions at the prisons in Iraq. He finds inadequate training of guards, and recommends that guard functions and interrogation functions be kept separate. Though abuses were occurring during the time of his investigation, he mentions none of the abuses found later by General Taguba. November 24, 2003: Anger by prisoners at Abu Ghriab over conditions leads to a protest (some would say riot). Among other things, prisoners want access to tea and cigarettes. During the protest 12 prisoners are shot, 3 killed. November 26, 2003: Iraqi Maj. General Abed Hamad Mowhoush loses consciousness and dies during interrogation in Iraq. The CIA is investigating. A second death during interrogation occurs, this time at Abu Ghriab. This is also under investigation. 2004 Jan 13: Army Spc. [an Spc., or Specialist, is one rank higher than a private], Joseph M. Darby, leaves a disk with photographs of prisoner abuse on the bed of a military investigator. How Spc. Darby came into possession of the disk is not currently clear. Jan 14, 2004: The Army begins an investigation into criminal conduct at Abu Ghraib. Jan 15, 2004: Gen John Abizaid, chief of Central Command in Tampa, Florida, tells Joint Chiefs Chairman (Rumsfeld’s top military aid) Gen. Richard B. Myers about the investigation. Abizaid reportedly tells Myers that the investigation is “a big deal.” Administrator Bremer is also told of the abuse allegations. (Bremer’s spokesman, Dan Senor, does not know when Bremer first saw the photos.) Jan 16, 2004: Central Command in Baghdad issues a one-paragraph news release that refers to “incidents of detainee abuse” at an unspecified U.S. prison in Iraq. (On May 7, Rumsfeld refers to the press release when he says, “we told the world” about the abuse scandal.) Jan 18, 2004: CentCom issues an “admonishment” to Maj Gen. Janis Karpinski, the leader of the 800 MP (military police) Brigade. Karpinski is nominally in charge of all of the prisons in Iraq. It also suspends a guard leader and a company commander. Jan 31, 2004: Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba is given the task of investigating prison abuses. Early February, 2004: Rumseld and Peter Pace, Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs inform President Bush about the investigations. Although Gen. Myers is not there, Pace stands in for him. Myers later states during the May 7 Senate hearing, that at that time, he had not seen the photos, but that the sexual and degrading nature of them had been described to him. In the Senate hearing on May 7, Rumsfeld is conspicuously vague on what was said to the President, as well as on how the President responded. Feb 26, 2004: Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, chief of command in Iraq, publicly discloses that 17 members of the military have been suspended, but gives no further details. March 12, 2004: Taguba formally submits his report, which finds widespread abuse, including "numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses" against Iraqi prisoners, carried out by military police, and civilian and military intelligence personnel. March 20, 2004: Six soldiers are officially accused of abuse. April 4, 2004: An internal Army investigation of the prisons recommends administrative sanctions against several unnamed commanders in Iraq. April 12, 2004: CBS’s 60 Minutes II tells the Pentagon that it is planning to broadcast photos of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghriab Prison. April 14, 2004: Gen. Myers calls Dan Rather to request that CBS delay the broadcast. Myers references the sensitive military situation in Iraq, and the fact that 90 Western hostages are then being held by Iraqi militants. CBS agrees to a one week delay. Myers calls a week later and gets a second delay. During the time that Myers is negotiating with CBS, he has yet to look at the photos himself. April 27, 2004: Rumsfeld appears on “Hardball” on MSNBC and is asked whether the “level of hatred, generally across the board in the country, in the faces of mobs, surprise(s) you? Rumsfeld responds, “I guess if you asked me a year ago, I would have expected that the word “occupation” and the negative aspects of that would not have been assigned to us to the extent it has been.” April 28, 2004. CBS broadcasts the photos on 60 Minutes II. Bush, Rumsfeld, and Myers all say that this is their first viewing of the photos. Hours before the CBS broadcast, Rumsfeld appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee, but says nothing about the scandal, the photos, or the impending broadcast. May 1, 2004: Gen. Sanchez signs off on (approves) the Taguba Report. May 2, 2004: Gen. Myers appears on four Sunday talk shows, and “categorically” assures George Stephanopoulos on This Week that the misconduct is limited to a few military police. When Stephanopoulos asks him to comment on the Taguba report, Myers says he hasn’t read it. When Stephanopoulos asks why he hadn’t read it, Myers says, “It’s working its way up the chain of command.” Later, Seymour Hersh, whose article in New Yorker Magazine, draws heavily from the Taguba report, expresses surprise and dismay on CNN that Myers has not read the Taguba report nor seen the photos. May 3, 2004: Bush and Rumsfeld first see the Taguba report. May 6, 2004: Bush apologizes to the Arab world for the abuses at Abu Ghriab. Bush and Rumsfeld first see uncensored photos of the abuse from a computer disk. May 7, 2004: Rumsfeld appears before the Senate, and apologizes for not informing the Senate earlier, and for not briefing the President more fully. He also apologizes for the scandal, but quickly suggests that had he gotten involved earlier, it might have led to “improper command influence.” In other words, while apologizing for things that occurred under his watch, Rumsfeld, implies that it was proper for him not to get involved. Themes from the chronology: 1) Reports by international organizations of abuse and torture go back over a year, and were largely shrugged off by U.S. authorities. 2) Concerns expressed by both Bremer and by Powell seem to have produced little visible action by the Pentagon. 3) The manner in which Rumsfeld and Myers distanced themselves from the scandal is striking. Either commanders at CentCom in Baghdad were downplaying the scandal, or Rumsfeld and Myers were sending signals that they didn’t want to know about it, or both. 4) Only public airing of the photos got the Pentagon to pay attention. Mere verbal reporting of torture did not produce much response from civilian authorities. 5) If there is a "Deep Throat" aspect to this story, it is "How did Spc. Darby get ahold of the disk of photos to begin with?" 6) Finally, while this chronology is suggestive of such laxity in the command structure that it rises to the level of criminal dereliction, it is interesting to note that General Taguba, whose report has earned so much praise, sees it differently. Indeed, his body of testimony yesterday before the Senate lacked the moral force and clarity of his written report. Taguba refused to endorse the notion that the problem went higher up in the chain of command. I predict that he will be proven wrong. In putting together this chronology, thanks to CNN, Fox News, CBS, ABC News, MSNBC, the Taguba Report, and USA Today for source materials….. |
| 5 Comments |
| Rumsfeld's Testimony: Straw Men and Red Herrings |
| 05.08.04 (2:04 pm) [edit] |
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More than once I have described our detention policy in Iraq as a gross violation of human rights, so brazenly carried out, that it was hiding in plain sight. In keeping with the Defense Department's ability to blind us with smoke and mirrors, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff General Richard B. Myers, and several other military officials offered more than five hours of testimony to congress yesterday. Unfortunately, their testimony was littered with false premises, all designed to excuse their conduct in dealing with the Torturegate scandal. Rumsfeld’s testimony alone had more red herrings in it than an Agatha Christie novel. During his remarks, Rumsfeld created numerous straw men, which served to set the parameters of the hearing, often went unchallenged by the congressmen, and provided cover for the Defense Department and the administration. Let’s address each one of them: 1. “Disclosure about the abuses at Abu Ghriab may unduly influence prosecutions, and compromise the rights of defendants.” Rumsfeld implied numerous times during his testimony that greater, timelier disclosure of the scandal have may imperiled the pending investigations and prosecutions. Casting himself as a great civil libertarian, Rumsfeld even implied at times that his distance from, and ignorance of the scandal was not a failing but an act of propriety. This is nonsense. His assertions notwithstanding, the defendants’ rights in no way require that the broad scandal be kept secret from the congress, the president, or the American people. The legal rights of the accused don’t dictate in any way that governmental officials hide the nature of the crimes committed. And such legal rights certainly don’t require the concealment of heinous and systemic misconduct. Due process simply demands that the specific defendants be accorded the presumption of innocence. Rumsfeld’s show of hand wringing and concern for the rights of the accused was too easily accepted by the committe members, with the exception of Hillary Clinton. Senator Clinton exposed Rumsfeld’s posturing, by comparing the Defense Department’s actions in dealing with Torturegate to the massive publicity that it gave the arrest of Champlain James J. Yee at Guantanamo Bay. The charges against Yee, all of which were eventually dropped, were accompanied by a government media blitz that suggested that Yee had been carrying classified documents and was part of some terrorist conspiracy to infiltrate Guantananmo Bay. As Clinton pointed out, Yee was put in solitary confinement, even as government sources were leaking to the press that this might be a capital crime. All of this uproar was based on charges that eventually proved to be so flimsy and unsupported, that they were all eventually dismissed. Rumsfeld’s newfound attention to the rights of defendants would come as a shock to Chaplain Yee, as it would to Los Alamos physicist Wen Ho Lee, and as it would to anthrax suspect Dr. Stephen Hill all of whom were hounded and demonized by the government before being exonerated. The notion that concern for “due process” led Rumsfeld to not inform congress or the American people about Torturegate is, to put it bluntly, a fraud. 2. “There are 18,000 criminal investigations and 3,000 court-marshals a year. I don’t know how we could reach into the bowels of each of them and keep tabs.” This statement by Rumsfeld is utterly silly and without merit. It assumes that all cases are equal, and that Torturegate is just another one of the 3,000 cases that are prosecuted in the military each year. As a result of the large number of prosecutions, Rumsfeld implied, the Secretary of Defense couldn’t possibly be knowledgeable about this case. Here’s the problem with this excuse: All court-martials are not equal. Any military prosecutor who is not an idiot would have taken one look at the pictures and videotapes from Abu Ghriab and realized that he was handling a case that was radioactive in nature. That prosecutor’s obligation—while simultaneously prosecuting the case—would have been to alert superiors in the chain of command that there was a major scandal brewing, one that had great political, military, and foreign relations implications. In fact, Central Command in Iraq was well aware of the scandal. Lt. General Lance Smith, Deputy Commander of Central Command, who testified along with Rumsfeld yesterday, spoke to this issue. He had seen the photos in January, he told Senator Lindsay Graham. Smith also implied that Generals Sanchez and Abizaid had both either seen the photos or were well aware of them. In addition, General Myers acknowledged knowing about the photos, and about their sexually degrading content, as early as January. In February, according to Myers and Rumsfeld, President Bush was told about them. Senator Graham commented during the hearing, “It didn’t take a rocket scientist to realize the explosive nature of the photos…that we were in a world of hurt.” Graham continued, “If you knew enough about the photos to call CBS, why didn’t you know enough to inform the congress?” One might also ask, why didn’t they take it upon themselves to look at the photos firsthand? The simplest, most plausible answer is that neither Myers, nor Rumsfeld wanted to know. The evidence suggests that from January though April, they thought they could “tough out” the story and keep it contained. In keeping with this MO, they chose to stick their heads in the sand. The motive is clear: As long as Myers and Rumseld didn’t look at the photos, and didn’t fully acquaint themselves with the details of the scandal, they wouldn’t be forced to make crucial decisions about the matter. Such self-imposed ignorance served Rumsfeld and Myers well during their testimony. Both men sought cover in the convenient excuse that without having looked at the photos, they couldn’t possibly have appreciated the magnitude of the scandal. Obviously all of this begged the question of why they didn’t seek to look at the photos in the first place. Republican Senator Susan Collins of Maine, saw the absurdity of this excuse. She asked why the Pentagon didn’t come forward with the story, and prepare both the congress and the American people for the photos, instead of asking CBS to delay the story. And one must make particular note of the bizarre irony of Gen. Myers asking Dan Rather to delay showing photos that Myers hadn’t bothered to look at himself. Imagine for a moment, calling up one of the country’s great networks and asking them to delay showing important news photos, when you haven’t looked at the photos yourself. That's chutzpah! If Myers believed that the publication of the photos could threaten troops in the field, and perhaps even derail the war effort, didn’t he have an absolute obligation to look at them before making such a determination? If they were important enough to suppress, weren’t they important enough to view? The fact that at that point Myers had not seen at the photos, dovetailed with the self-serving theme that Rumsfeld used all day: Rumsfeld portrayed himself as a lonely department head, sequestered in the Pentagon, ignorant of all the petty goings-on in the field. When Senator John McCain asked who was in charge of interrogation at Abu Ghraib, Rumsfeld looked flustered, and asked General Smith to provide the answer. McCain was incredulous: “You mean, Mr. Secretary, you can’t answer that question? It’s a straightforward question. It would take one phone call to get the information!” Moreover, even though the existence of the videotapes was public knowledge on Monday—I wrote about them myself after hearing journalist Sy Hersh describe them in a radio interview—apparently, these videotapes, which contain footage of rapes and beatings of women and children, were simply too difficult for the Secretary of Defense to obtain from his own Defense Department. Rumsfeld would have us believe that for the Secretary of Defense to secure a videotape from his own legal division is harder than getting an advance copy of the latest Harry Potter novel. That pathetic defense may have served Rumsfeld in the short run, but it will not withstand scrutiny. 3. “We did inform the public about these prosecutions during January press conferences at Cent Com.” This explanation by Rumsfeld was once known as the “modified limited hang-out” strategy during the Watergate era. The idea is, you let the public have a little bit of negative information, in the hope that it will deflect any demand for more information. It also allows the conspirators to claim later on that “we did tell you the truth!” Yes, Torturegate was discussed in limited press releases from Central Command in Baghdad in January and March. This was clearly their way of burying the story, the equivalent of releasing bad news on a Friday afternoon when it will be least seen. Those press releases gave no indication of the severity and gruesomeness of the scandal. Rumsfeld’s statement to senators that “we told it to the world in January,” is grossly misleading. The world knew nothing of the real nature of the charges. Finally, one of the most disturbing aspects of Rumsfeld’s testimony was his consistent implication that the real problem wasn’t so much the abusive conduct; rather, it was the fact that there were pictures that showed the abusive conduct. Numerous times during the hearing, he referred to the “illegal, unauthorized release of classified information,” as if the scandal were the fault of some self-righteous tattle-tale in Baghdad. This, indeed, is how he views the issue, as a public relations problem produced by some rat-fink in the chain of command who dared leak the Taguba Report to Sy Hersh. It doesn’t take much reading between the lines to see that the current administration is far more concerned about the fact that we can see the pictures, than it is about the criminal conduct that's in the pictures. In toto, the conduct of the Pentagon in dealing with Torturegate, both in terms of actions committed and omitted, screams out one thing: cover-up. High officials were desperately hoping that the problem would go away, and not damage either the war effort or the Bush presidential campaign. To this end, they actively stayed out of the loop, and kept us out of the loop as well. To the lasting embarrassment and disgrace of the administration, two men got in the way of the cover-up: Dan Rather, and Seymour Hersh. Thank goodness for the press. |
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| My Two and a Half Minutes with Sam Donaldson |
| 05.06.04 (6:28 pm) [edit] |
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I don’t listen to much political talk radio, regardless of host, level of partisanship, or ideology. Its low level of discussion and high level of emotionality don't agree with my blood pressure. So why did I find myself listening to talk radio this morning as I was running errands? Well, the evening before, I had put on WMAL-AM in Washington, DC, to hear the 7:30 news on my way home from work. When I got in my car this morning, the radio was of course on the same station, and Sam Donaldson was holding forth on the subject of Donald Rumsfeld. Should Rummy be fired, he asked? Sam was discussing Rumsfeld’s aversion to following the Geneva Convention rules on prisoners of war. On another day I would have immediately changed the station, but I’ve always liked Sam, toupee and all, had never heard his radio show before ("Live in America"), and was just plain glad that I hadn’t landed on the ubiquitous G. Gordon Liddy Show, or even worse, Dr Laura! As I went about my morning errands, Sam went on to remind us in the audience that Rummy didn’t seem to have kept the president informed on the gathering Abu Ghriab scandal. Given all this, Sam asked, was the dreaded R-word--“resignation"-- appropriate here? As I listened to Sam setting the stage for a call-in discussion, I felt an invisible hand grabbing my right arm, and moving it toward my cell phone. I felt a mixture of impulse and ambivalence, like that of a frat-boy with a drunken sorority girl at 4 in the morning. I was about to do the unthinkable: become a radio talk show caller! I placed the toll-free call, all the while navigating DC rush hour traffic, and immediately got the producer of the show. “What is it you’d like to say?” she asked. “Well,” I said, quickly gathering my thoughts, “I’d like to say that beyond the issue of the abuse of prisoners is the broader issue of why we are conducting random sweeps of innocent Iraqi citizens in the first place. That in itself is unethical.” “That’s good,” she said. You’ll be the second caller.” Well, her promise that I was second in line was as reliable as Dick Cheney talking about reconstituted nuclear programs in Iraq. I waited, while Bob, and Dan, and Tom, and Janet weighed in with their remarks, each scarier than the last. The gist of their view was that war is hell, the old rules don’t apply, and that the Iraqis ought to get over all this and stop shedding crocodile tears. The worst of the bunch was Janet, who said with great confidence, “Remember, Sam, those are bad people in there, who don’t like us anyway. We have to fight fire with fire.” As Sam gamely reminded her that we were trying to win hearts and minds, she continued her rant, “They must have done some bad things to get in that prison in the first place.” Her comments once again impressed upon me that the average American thinks that these are hardened Al Qaeda operatives in Abu Ghriab, whom we have ferreted out with our superior intelligence capabilities. Are you kidding me? Heck, we can’t even tell which Republican Guard general is which, as became evident when it turned out that the Iraqi general we chose to lead the militia in Fallujah was a different general than we thought he was! It’s a certainty that we have no meaningful intel on the people rounded up in these crude dragnets: grocers, mechanics, shopkeepers, unemployed folks. It simply sooths our guilt to think that Osama’s right hand man is somewhere hidden in their midst. The truth is, many Americans don’t really see Iraqis as individuals. Rather, they see an undifferentiated group of Middle Easterners with whom we have a score to settle. My evidence? After 9/11, a dragnet was conducted in the US, rounding up every Arab who had any irregularity with his or her immigration papers. Of the 762 who were rounded up, none of them had criminal records. Eighty-four of these detainees wound up at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, where the justice department now acknowledges they were systematically abused: punched, kicked, and routinely thrown against walls. The most telling part of the abuse however was verbal. Here are the statements attributed to the guards: “Whatever you did at the World Trade Center, we will do to you,” “You’re never going to leave here,” “Don’t ask any questions, otherwise you will be dead,” “Put your nose against the wall or we will break your neck.” When detainees prayed, officers said, “Shut the fuck up! Don’t pray, Fucking Muslim. You’re praying bullshit.” Clearly, for the guards in Brooklyn, these prisoners had morphed into 9/11 terrorists, despite the fact that they were simply ordinary folks, trying to make a living, who had been caught up in a law enforcement sweep! Not one of them was ever implicated in terrorism. The Village Voice, in June of 2002, chronicled the plight of Pakistani cab driver Shakir Baloch, who was caught up in this sweep in New York: On a bleak block in Sunset Park, under the BQE, looms the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), the high-security federal prison to which untold numbers of Arabs and South Asians have been whisked after being nabbed from their taxis, mosques, and apartments. More post-September 11 detainees have been jailed in county facilities in New Jersey, but critics say MDC houses some of the worst constitutional and human rights violations by the federal government in these cases. It is a black hole, they say, where immigrants disappear for months into extreme isolation and deprivation, only to come out the other end accused of no crime that justifies their jail time. Shakir Baloch was one of those who vanished into the MDC "hole"—solitary confinement—for many months, later winding up at home in Canada, a free and, as far as he can tell, unmonitored man. Last week he spoke by phone with the Voice about his incarceration, bolstering the claims of lawyers and advocates who have filed complaints of cruel conditions and wrangled an ongoing investigation of MDC by the U.S. Office of Inspector General. "In the beginning, I was thinking, [September 11] was a very big incident. They're doing detention for security purposes. They have a right," said Baloch. A limo driver at the time, he was arrested in New York on September 19, not charged with anything, and confined in solitary for five months. For several months, no one knew where he was. "After a while, I was like, why are they taking so long, not giving me the right to call people, not giving me a lawyer?" he said. Baloch spent 23 and a half hours a day alone in his cell under bright lights that were always on, without television or, often, even reading material. He was shackled hand and foot when outside. He had only hints that dozens of others—perhaps 50 or more, according to lawyers—were similarly confined. "Through the small window, I saw the guards taking others," he said. And he heard rumors that other detainees were attempting suicide. His wife eventually tracked him down, and Baloch got a lawyer who, outraged at the imprisonment without cause, filed a habeas corpus petition. As previously reported by the Voice, Baloch was charged promptly thereafter with illegally crossing the U.S.-Canada border—before September 11, a rarely prosecuted offense. He ultimately pled guilty to that and using a fake social security card and was sentenced to time served. He was deported in April without his identification documents or belongings. In Canada, he was diagnosed with tuberculosis and severe depression. Not long ago considered too dangerous to mingle with other inmates, Baloch was approved by a doctor to collect public assistance. He said he had been told to take it easy and not seek work for six months. Worse than the confinement itself was the injustice of it, said Baloch. The day he was arrested, he said, "They told me, 'You will be going to Canada tomorrow. You have your flight at six o'clock in the morning.' " So he thought nothing of signing a piece of paper waiving his right to seek the Canadian consulate's help. "I didn't know they were going to keep me for seven months," he said. This is ugly stuff, and on the same continuum as what is happening in Iraq. The difference is, when it takes place in the US, guards feel that there is some constraint, some limit on how far they can abuse the inmates. Far away in Abu Ghraib, no such constraints were felt. Anyone familiar with the book “Lord of the Flies,” knows this dynamic. So, all of this was swirling through my head as I listened to Sam Donaldson engage the callers. Finally, it was my turn! I heard Sam say, “So what’s your view, Jeff?” I launched into my spiel with all the gusto of someone who had been waiting 45 minutes (second caller, indeed!) I told Sam that the military dragnets weren’t getting enough attention, and were both immoral and stupid if we wanted to win over anyone’s hearts and minds. I pointed out that even if there had been no abuse, and we had served the prisoners four-star meals, to simply drag people from their homes violated all norms of due process and was unconscionable. Sam wanted to focus on Rummy: “Well Rumsfeld doesn’t think those rules apply in this situation. What do you think about his failure to keep the president informed?” I told Sam that I didn’t believe the president was uninformed, and that this was the most uncurious president we’ve ever had. “If the president didn’t know, it’s because he didn’t want to know. Blaming Rumsfeld is window dressing” “So you think it’s a bit like the August 6th briefing that the President got, that warned about terrorist activity.” “Yes,” I said, “Bush didn’t show any curiosity about that either!” I was on a roll now, about to pull out my best material. But before I could get out my next word, I heard Sam’s voice: “Well, thanks for the comment Jeff. We’ve gotta go to break.” I had to admit that Sam had been charming and pleasant throughout our 2 minute and 40 second chat. But I felt like I had just taken a bite from a big steak, and then the waiter had come and taken my plate away! “Thanks,” I said, clicking off my cell phone. Even though moments later my blood pressure was settling back to normal, it was at that moment that I realized once again why I don’t listen to talk radio…. |
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| Torturegate in Iraq: The Plot Thickens |
| 05.04.04 (10:45 pm) [edit] |
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A scandal earns the suffix “-gate,” when the best efforts of those who want to conceal it fail, and the scandal spins out of control, exposing widespread corruption. This is precisely what is happening in the case of abused Iraqi prisoners. It is an ominous sign for the Bush administration that it only took several days for Torturegate to reach this ignoble status. As reported on May 4 by ABC reporter Martha Raddatz and New Yorker contributor Seymour Hersh (both of whom are privy to much of the evidence), what began with a handful of horrific photos on CBS has metastasized into a story about thousands of photos of abuse, most of them worse than anything seen so far, as well as videotapes. What began as a story about torture and humiliation in Tier 1 of Abu Ghraib prison, where the adult male prisoners are interrogated, has grown into a story about the abuse of women and young boys in other parts of the prison, as well as allegations of murder. What began with charges of criminal behavior by six military police personnel has mushroomed into a story about a network of corruption that included the CIA and civilian contractors. The significance of this story, however, goes well beyond the behavior of soldiers in the war zone. The callous disregard for the welfare of Iraqi citizens raises urgent questions about policies that originated in Washington, not in Baghdad, and calls into question the whole integrity of the war effort. The more sensational facts of Torturegate are so shocking that it is easy to fixate on them, and miss the forest for the trees: With all the understandable attention being paid to the mistreatment of detainees, few have stopped to ask the overarching question: By what legal, moral, or strategic authority were we rounding up random Iraqi citizens in the first place? It is important to note that these detentions did not last an hour, or a day, or a week, but rather three months on the average. Since there is general agreement that over 60% of the detainees were guilty of nothing, and that we’ve gotten very little usable intelligence from the detentions, what possible rationale is there for—how else can it be described—systematicall y kidnapping citizens off the streets and holding them for months at a time? This is the second layer of the scandal: even if no physical abuse had occurred, the detentions themselves, wholesale violations of basic human rights, would alone be appalling. Who among us would tolerate having loved ones carted away and held for months, incommunicado? Such practices undo centuries of legal protections in the US. What makes these practices appropriate in Iraq? And to suggest that the existence of the insurgency makes it okay to disregard any notion of due process, is to make common cause with every thug and dictator who has ever used that rationale. Both Saddam and Pinochet would appreciate the irony of such an argument. Last week, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, when asked by Chris Matthews what the biggest surprise of the war was so far, responded that he was surprised that the Iraqis, a year later, still thought of us as “occupiers.” Given what we’ve been doing to the ordinary citizens of Iraq--shopkeepers, students, lawyers, doctors, and accountants--Rumsfeld’s level of naiveté is itself shocking. Did he think it would endear us to the Iraqi people to brutally detain them with no probable cause? I keep coming back to the same question: What on earth did we think we were gaining from dismissing the basic civil rights of Iraqis, and rounding them up willy-nilly? This is hardly the model of American values that we should be projecting. The message that the Bush administration is sending to Iraq is, “When the going gets tough, simply disregard the rights of citizens.” The problem is, Iraqis are already quite familiar with that message, thank you. It is time that we recognize that our policy of foisting military dragnets upon Iraq’s civilian population has been corrupt from the beginning. Its corruptness has simply been hiding in plain sight; it took the acute scandal of Abu Ghraib to shock us into awareness. Rumsfeld’s feelings of surprise notwithstanding, it is now very clear why we have sewn such a bitter harvest in Iraq. The third level of scandal emerging from Torturegate is the difference between the punishments contemplated for enlisted personnel and those for officers. The military recently announced with great fanfare that seven officers have received letters of reprimand that will prevent them from being promoted, and likely end their military careers. So what? The message here seems to be that someone who presides over a criminal conspiracy, but stays at arm’s length, has committed no crime. One doesn’t have to be too cynical to wonder whether officers are being coddled in order to make sure that the scandal does not go any higher up the chain of command. As more voices from congress are heard on the scandal, it will be interesting to see whether John Kerry weighs in on this debate; this, after all, it is one of the great foreign relations catastrophes in our generation. The only consolation to take from all this is the knowledge that once a scandal reaches “-gate” status, all the cover-ups in the world cannot stand up to the public’s desire to know. Ultimately, Torturegate will find its way to the front door of both the White house and Pentagon, because it powerfully raises the question: Were the civilian authorities simply incompetent in the way they deployed American power, or were they complicit in the abuse? |
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| Dealing With Torture in Iraq's Abu Ghraib Prison--Correction or Cover-up? |
| 05.03.04 (12:20 pm) [edit] |
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I saw a scene yesterday that was something out of a Kafka novel, as General Richard B. Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, went on a whirlwind tour of political talk shows. His role was to reassure the public that the abusive practices in Iraqs Abu Ghraib prison, as shown on 60 Minutes II last week, were the isolated acts of a few American soldiers, and did not represent a systemic problem. But when asked whether he had read the fifty-three page report by Major General Antonio M. Taguba, which described a systemic breakdown of conduct by authorities at the prison, and which detailed practices that included the burning of detainees with chemicals, and sodomy with flashlights and broomsticks, Myers said he had not read it. What? Why hadnt he read this comprehensive accounting of the abuses at Abu Ghraib? It hasnt worked its way up the chain to me yet, he told interviewers with a straight face. That remarkable series of interviews yesterday, stands as a microcosm of the failures of this administration: 1) Incompetence: Who in their right mind would send a high-ranking official to reassure the public, when that official had not made himself fully knowledgeable about the serious matter at hand? 2) Stupidity: How smart can General Myers be when he arrogantly told interviewers that I can categorically say that I have seen no evidence to suggest that it (the abuse) was systematic, though he hadnt yet bothered to look at all the evidence? 3) Insensitivity: Major General Tagubas report was published two months ago, not two days ago. The fact that this was not a serious enough breach of conduct for Myers to become proactive and read it, suggests that this only began to be seen as a serious problem after the 60 Minutes revelations. It also suggests to me that the administration saw this more as a political problem than as a criminal and moral issue. As facts come to light, it is becoming more and more evident that the 60 Minutes story performed a two-fold service: It not only brought out horrific facts that needed to be exposed; it also short-circuited an ongoing military cover-up, a conspiracy that would have had us believe that these abuses were the isolated actions of a few bad apples. What is coming to light is that involvement in the torture extends to the CIA, to military intelligence personnel, and to civilian contractors. Even the notion being put forth by military officials that these were "interrogation techniques" gone bad, strains credulity, and is simply an attempt to put a fig leaf on criminal behavior. You don't have to be a psychologist to know that these practices had everything to do with gratifying the perpetrators' sadism, and nothing to do with any intelligence yield. The notion that there is some intelligence value to making a man masturbate while a woman stands in front of him and laughs, is at best Orwellian. Here is a part of the testimony presented at the court hearing of Staff Sgt. Ivan L. Frederick II, one of the enlisted men charged in the case: "I went down to Tier 1 and when I looked down the corridor, I saw two naked detainees, one masturbating to another kneeling with its mouth open, I thought I should just get out of there. I didn't think it was right, as it seemed like the wrong thing to do. I saw Staff Sergeant Frederick walking towards me, and he said, `Look what these animals do when you leave them alone for two seconds.' " In truth, this is not simply a story about torture; its a story about the underlying contempt of these soldiers for the Iraqi people. As such, it presents another hideous parallel with the war in Viet Nam. Just as we were quite prepared to destroy Viet Nam in the service of saving it, just as the word gook was not only used about the people we were fighting against, but also about the people we were fighting with, so we are perfectly willing to terrorize and degrade the very Iraqi citizens who we claim to be liberating. Dont be misled by the description of Cellblock 1A as the maximum security part of Abu Ghraib prison. As Seymour Hersh reports in the New Yorker, our intelligence was far too crude to make any subtle distinctions between detainees. These were not hardened terrorists; rather they were everyday Iraqis, rounded up randomly in one of the many military sweeps. Muwafaq Sami, an Iraqi lawyer with no apparent connection to terrorism whatsoever, describes in todays Washington Post how he, his 57 year old father, and his three brothers were dragged out of their beds in the middle of the night, and were taken to a detention center at the Baghdad Airport. There, they were tortured by their American captors for nine days, before he and his father were freed. His three brothers however, are still imprisoned. If the military wants to gain more useful information not only from detainees, but also the communities and neighborhoods from which the detainees come, I have a novel suggestion for the army: treat them with respect. These abuses have shattered the USs moral standing not only within the Arab community, but within the entire international community. If there is a silver lining in this cloud of disgrace, it is that these revelations are not only resonating around the world, they are also resonating through our own Supreme Court, which recently heard the Bush administration argue for the presidents right to hold individualseven American citizensindefinitely, without access to counsel. The Bush administrations argument to the court, reduced to its essence was, in a crisis, trust us, we know best. If we ever needed a civics lesson on the dangerousness of this judicial view, Abu Ghraib provides it. The moment you take away a prisoners right to counsel, you begin to strip away his humanity, and you take away his final protection against abuse and torture. Indeed, weve already seen this happen on American soil, in Brooklyn, where innocent detaineesincarcerated as the result of a post 9/11 dragnetwere systematically abused [see my blog entry, Lord Actons Revenge: Brutality in Brooklyn, 3/31/04]. In order to even begin to atone for this breach of decency, Iraqis, Americans, and all citizens of the world will have to see a full, credible accounting of who was responsible for the torture at Abu Ghraib. Simply scapegoating a handful of reservists--however hideous their conduct--will not be sufficient. And the president should do something that will at the very least, start the healing process: he should apologize to the Iraqi people. |
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I'm a psychologist in Washington, DC, and have a progressive outlook on today's political scene.
jeffrowan111@aol.com Jeff Rowan, Ph.D.